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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Albert Ciccone was charged with two counts of first degree murder (by premeditation) 
after he struck his wife with his car, killing her and the fetus in her womb. A jury found 
Mr. Ciccone guilty of first degree murder with respect to his wife, but it found him guilty of the 
lesser offense of second degree murder with respect to the fetus. The district court imposed a 
fixed life sentence for the first degree murder and a fifteen year fixed sentence for the second 
degree murder. 
On appeal Mr. Ciccone presents three issues for this Court's consideration: (1) whether 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his closing arguments; (2) whether Mr. Ciccone's 
constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated; and (3) whether Mr. Ciccone's 
fixed life sentence is excessive. He respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction 
and/or sentence and: order that the case be dismissed based on violations of his speedy trial 
rights; remand the case for a new trial based on the prosecutor's misconduct; or reduce his fixed 
life sentence (or remand the case for a new sentencing hearing) based on the excessiveness of 
that sentence. 
The State argues that the prosecutor did not engage in any misconduct and, alternatively, 
to the extent that he did, that misconduct does not rise to the level of fundamental error or was 
harmless (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-18), Mr. Ciccone was not denied his rights to a speedy a trial 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.I9-35), and Mr. Ciccone's sentence is not excessive (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.38-45). The present reply brief is necessary to address each of these arguments. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated 111 
Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
2 
ISSUES 
l. Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by twice commenting on Mr. Ciccone's silence 
and then asking the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone based on sympathy for the victim? 
2. Were Mr. Ciccone's speedy trial rights violated when, on the eve of trial, the district 
court granted the State's motion for a continuance and set Mr. Ciccone's trial out an 
additional six months? 





Mr. Ciccone Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By 
Twice Commenting On Mr. Ciccone's Silence And Once Asking The Jury To Convict Based On 
Its Sympathy For The Victim 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
when, during the rebuttal portion of his closing argument, he twice commented on Mr. Ciccone's 
silence, i.e, his decision not to testify, and once asked the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone out of 
sympathy for the alleged victim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-21.) In response, the State addresses 
each instance of misconduct in turn, attempting to characterize the prosecutor's statements as 
permissible comments on the evidence and arguing (alternatively) that the unobjected-to 
misconduct does not meet the standard for fundamental error and the objected-to misconduct was 
harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-I8.) For the reasons set forth more fully below, the State's 
arguments are without merit. 
A The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct When He (Twice) Implicitly Asked The Jury To 
Draw A Negative Inference From Mr. Ciccone's Decision Not To Testify 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
by twice asking the jury to draw a negative inference from Mr. Ciccone's exercise of his Fifth 
Amendment right not to testify. He argued that the first such incident occurred when, in 
discussing what the State had sought to portray as a physical altercation between Mr. Ciccone 
and his wife immediately before she walked off and was struck and killed by Mr. Ciccone's 
vehicle, the prosecutor, after suggesting that Kathleen Ciccone may have thrown her purse at her 
husband during this altercation, asserted as follows: "There's only two people that know, and 
Kathleen Ciccone isn't here to tell us." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.I853, Ls.3-23; see Appellant's Brief, 
pp.9, 12-14.) He argued that the second such incident occurred when, while arguing that 
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Mr. Ciccone intentionally struck his wife, and that the jury should reject defense counsel's 
"accident" theory, the prosecutor argued as follows: 
There is no testimony that he was looking down at his watch, that the 
cigarette smoke had blown in his face, that he was changing the radio station, that 
a cassette dropped, a cigarette dropped in his pants, he had to try and put it out 
real quick. No testimony as to that. Absolutely none. He doesn't say anything 
about any-
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.l856, Ls.2-9; see Appellant's Brief, pp.9, 12-13.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State addresses each comment in turn, arguing that both of 
the prosecutor's statements were pennissible comments on the evidence; alternatively, the State 
contends that the second comment, which was objected-to, was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.5-18.) These arguments fail. 
1. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct When He Commented On Mr. Ciccone's 
Silence When, In Describing An Alleged Altercation Between Mr. Ciccone And 
His Wife. He Argued That "There's Only Two People That Know [What 
Happened], And Kathleen Ciccone Isn't Here To Tell Us" 
As noted, in discussing what the State had sought to portray as a physical altercation 
between Mr. Ciccone and his wife immediately before she walked off and was struck and killed 
by Mr. Ciccone's vehicle, the prosecutor, after suggesting that Kathleen Ciccone may have 
thrown her purse at her husband during this altercation, asserted as follows: "There's only two 
people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone isn't here to tell us." (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.l853, Ls.3-23.) 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that this was necessarily a comment on 
Mr. Ciccone's silence since he was the only other one who knew exactly what had happened 
with his wife immediately prior to her death, and, thus, he was the only one who could have told 
the jury precisely what had happened, but he did not testify. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9, 12-13.) 
The State argues that the prosecutor's argument was not an improper comment on 
Mr. Ciccone's decision not to testify, but rather a comment on statements Mr. Ciccone made 
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during his interrogation regarding "the state of certain evidence."] (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-
10.) The State further argues that the prosecutor's argument "centered around Ciccone's actual 
statements and Kathleen's inability to refute them, rather than Ciccone's failure to testify .... " 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) The State's argument, however, is illogical and represents a 
mischaracterization of what was actually argued to the jury. 
As was quoted in the State's own brief, the relevant portion of the prosecutor's argument 
is as follows: 
Let's talk about [defense counsel] talking about the scene on K & R Ranch 
Road. How this precious purse a woman would have carried, the bag of food she 
obviously had in her possession because that's what Albert said. 
So I guess she has got the purse in the car, the bag of food in the car, the 
medicine, the sweater tied around her and everything. And she decided to get out 
with all of that stuff on K & R Ranch Road . . . and decided to walk however 
many feet -- let's just say -- it is on the chart -- walk up there with all the purse, 
sweatshirt tied around her waist, bottle of pills, and all the food bag, and had 
enough wherewithal to throw it all at him right- or left-handed. Maybe she let the 
purse down to get the McDonalds bag or Burger King to throw at him. Maybe she 
just left it there. I don't know. There's only two people that know, and Kathleen 
Ciccone isn't here to tell us. 
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1853, Ls.3-23 (emphasis added); see also Respondent's Brief, p.9.) 
The context of the prosecutor's argument makes it clear that he was not talking about 
Mr. Ciccone's interrogation, or even about Mr. Ciccone's actual statements. Rather, it makes it 
obvious that he was commenting on the state of the physical evidence and the inferences to be 
] In addition to arguing that there was no misconduct in the first instance, the State further asserts 
that there was no fundamental error. However, since the State presented only two conclusory 
statements on this point (see Respondent's Brief, p.9 ("Ciccone, however, has failed to show that 
complained of comments constituted misconduct at all, much less misconduct rising to the level 
of fundamental error."), p.1 0 ("Ciccone has failed to establish error, much less any constitutional 
error that is 'clear or obvious' from the record and actually prejudiced Ciccone's right to a fair 
trial. [State v.] Perry, 150 Idaho [209,] 226 ... [(2010)].)," no further discussion of the 
fundamental error question is required herein and Mr. Ciccone refers this Court to pages 13 
through 16 of his Appellant's Brief, where the fundamental error issue is analyzed fully. 
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drawn therefrom and, most importantly, he was asking the jury to accept the State's speculative 
version of events because Mr. Ciccone failed to testify and, therefore, failed to refute that version 
of events. As such, the prosecutor's argument cannot reasonably be construed as anything but a 
comment on Mr. Ciccone's silence and, thus, was highly improper. 
2. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct When He Commented On Mr. Ciccone's 
Silence By Arguing That "There Is No Testimony" That Mr. Ciccone Was 
Distracted Or Not Looking At His Wife Immediately Before Striking Her With 
His Car 
Moments after making the above argument, while arguing that Mr. Ciccone intentionally 
struck his wife, and that the jury should reject defense counsel's "accident" theory, the 
prosecutor further argued as follows: 
There is no testimony that he was looking down at his watch, that the 
cigarette smoke had blown in his face, that he was changing the radio station, that 
a cassette dropped, a cigarette dropped in his pants, he had to try and put it out 
real quick. No testimony as to that. Absolutely none. He doesn't say anything 
about any-
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1856, Ls.2-9 (emphasis added).) In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued 
that this was also a comment on Mr. Ciccone's silence since he was the only one in the world 
who could have testified where he was looking and whether he was distracted in the split second 
before he struck his wife with his car. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10, 12-13, 14-16.) 
The State responds, by claiming that the prosecutor's argument was not necessarily a 
comment on Mr. Ciccone's decision not to testify, but could "equally be viewed as a 
comment ... on the absence of any reasonable explanation during his interview with Detective 
Wolfe from which the jury could conclude Kathleen's death was the result of an accident." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) In attempting to further this argument, the State contends that the 
prosecutor's repeated use of the word "testimony" was merely an "inartful" way of referring to 
Mr. Ciccone's statements to the police. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) 
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Because the State's disingenuous argument on this issue is belied not only by a 
commonsense reading of the plain language of the prosecutor's argument, but also by the context 
in which that argument was made, Mr. Ciccone submits that this Court should completely 
disregard that argument. 
As an alternative to its mischaracterization of the prosecutor's comment on 
Mr. Ciccone's silence as a benign comment on the evidence, the State argues that, to the extent 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct, that misconduct was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.13-14.) But there again, the State's argument is based on a mischaracterization-this time, of 
Mr. Ciccone's argument. The State characterizes Mr. Ciccone's argument alternative as being 
"that this Court is precluded from finding the error harmless under State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 
575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005)" (Respondent's Brief, p.13 (emphasis added)), and "that 
whenever a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon a comment on the defendant's silence 
is reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine, the error can never be harmless because it 
cannot be cured by a judicial admonition" (Respondent's Brief, p.13 (emphasis added)). 
However, Mr. Ciccone never made such arguments. He never spoke in such absolutes, and he 
certainly never argued that Lopez categorically precludes a finding of harmless error; he merely 
asserted that Lopez makes it clear that "prosecutorial comments on the defendant's silence may 
be so prejudicial that even a curative instruction is insufficient to cure the error." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.15 (emphasis added).) 
The fact is that curative instructions may be insufficient to cure certain trial errors. See 
State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 274 P.3d 1279, 1282-83 (Ct. App. 2012) (explicitly 
rejecting the State's argument that, because jurors are generally presumed to follow instructions, 
a curative instruction will automatically render a trial error harmless). This is especially true 
8 
where the error is particularly prejudicial or the case is particularly close. ld. at 1283. Given the 
facts and circumstances of this case (see Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16), Mr. Ciccone submits that 
the prosecutor's comment on his silence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967). 
B. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct When He Asked The Jurors To Convict 
Mr. Ciccone Based On Their Sympathy For The Victim 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone also argued that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct when he concluded his closing arguments with the following remarks: 
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they have and 
everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years old. Her death is a 
tragedy. Give her life meaning and give her death the sense of justice that it 
requires. Hold the defendant accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, 
premeditated actions that he took that night [sic]. 
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1860, Ls.15-22; see Appellant's Brief, pp.16-21.) Specifically, Mr. Ciccone 
argued that these remarks were improper because they were a plea for the jury to convict 
Mr. Ciccone based on matters outside the evidence-namely, sympathy for the deceased. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-21.) 
In response, the State argues that "the prosecutor was merely repeating what Ciccone 
himself had already argued," through his counsel, about the deceased's death being tragic, and 
that it was a "proper, measured response to Ciccone's argument that the jury should 'hold 
[Ciccone] in [their] hands' and only find him guilty of 'accidentally'" killing his wife and his 
unborn child. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) The State also argues, in the alternative, that even 
if the prosecutor did something improper, the error does not rise to the level of fundamental 
error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.17-18.) 
Again, however, the State has completely mischaracterized the prosecutor's arguments, 
and the context in which they were made, in an effort to make them seem benign. Looking at the 
9 
portion of defense counsel's closing argument which the State now claims the offensive 
comments were made in response to,2 one can see very clearly that what defense counsel was 
arguing was: (1) the decedent's death was the result of Mr. Ciccone's reckless driving, not 
malice, and, therefore, Mr. Ciccone should not be found guilty of murder; (2) despite the tragedy 
of this case, the jurors ought to not to be swayed by sympathy or vindictiveness in reaching their 
conclusions but, instead, because of the gravity of their mission, should faithfully follow the law; 
and (3) the jurors should not allow themselves to be bullied into finding Mr. Ciccone guilty. 
2 On page 15 of its Respondent's Brief, the State identifies the argument of defense counsel 
which it claims the prosecutorial arguments in question were responding to. That argument of 
defense counsel was as follows: 
Stupid car driver. Absolutely stupid. Dumbest thing he ever did. 
Undisputed. We agree. But that's not premeditation. That is not malignant heart. 
That is not something with malice aforethought. 
If we caught one of our kids driving like that, we'd take the car keys away 
and ground them. No. There is nothing that I can do, that Albert can do, that 
anybody in this courtroom can do about the loss that everybody has suffered. I 
can't fix that. I wish to God I could. I would. He wishes he could. He wishes he 
could fix that. 
Forget about the lawyers and lawsuit. He wishes he could bring her back, 
but he can't. So June Ciccone, Kathy Figueredo, they have held their kids in their 
hands all these years. I have held Albert in my hands for the past year. Now I am 
going to hand him over to you, each of you individually. You each hold Albert in 
your hands. You each have the power to make a decision. You each have the 
ability to decide how to handle this case, each and everyone of you. And you 
can't let anybody else bully you. You can't let anybody else step on you. You 
have to go back there in that room, that little room back there, and decide. You, 
each of you, have to decide. 
If you feel during this process that somebody is pushing you in a direction 
you don't want to go, just send a note to the bailiff. The bailiff will give it to the 
judge, and the judge will take care of it. 
You each have got Albert in your hands. You each get to decide. You 
each have that power. So use it, use it faithfully. Follow the rules given to you by 
the judge. Make sure he proves any case he has got beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Look at that evidence. Because right now, I am giving you Albert. Thank you. 
(Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1847, L.l - p.1848, L.13.) 
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(See Tr. Vol. VIII, p.1847, L.l - p.1848, L.13.) Defense counsel most certainly did not urge the 
jury to decide this case based on sympathy or a desire to seek "justice," i. e., revenge (in fact, he 
argued quite the opposite, which is completely appropriate), and, thus, the prosecutor had no 
right to make any such exhortations either. Moreover, even if defense counsel had said 
something improper, the State's remedy would have been to object; improper arguments by 
defense counsel are not license for the prosecutor to engage in misconduct in return. Surely, two 
wrongs do not make a right. 
In light of the foregoing, the prosecutor's violation of Mr. Ciccone's rights to due process 
and a fair trial is clear and obvious. Further, the effect on the outcome of the trial is equally 
clear, as it was an exhortation to find Mr. Ciccone guilty of first degree (premeditated) murder, 
the greatest offense on which the jury was instructed. 
II. 
Mr. Ciccone's Statutory And Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated When The 
District Court Granted The State's Motion For A Continuance And Pushed His Trial Back By 
Almost Six Months 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that his statutory and constitutional rights to 
a speedy trial were violated because he was not tried until 446 days (nearly 15 months) after his 
arrest, and 343 days (nearly a full year) after the State's filing of its Information. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.21-38.) He argued first that under the standards set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), his speedy trial rights under both the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions3 were violated by the delay in bringing him to trial because the 
3 As noted in Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief (pp.22-23 & n.lO), the Idaho Supreme Court has 
adopted the same four-factored test for evaluating speedy trial claims brought under the Idaho 
Constitution as was mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo for speedy 
trial claims raised under the United States Constitution. 
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length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial, the State's reasons for the delay did not justify 
that delay, Mr. Ciccone timely asserted his right to a speedy trial, and Mr. Ciccone was 
prejudiced by the delay in bringing his case to trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-36.) Next, he 
argued that his speedy trial rights under I.C. §§ 19-106 and 19-3501 were violated because, as 
had been previously demonstrated, the reasons for the delay in bringing him to trial were 
insufficient to justify the delay and, therefore, the State had failed to show "good cause" for the 
delay. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-37.) 
In response, the State begins its argument with a discussion of Idaho's speedy trial 
statute, asserting that, because certain of the State's witnesses were military personnel, 
temporarily assigned to duty outside the State of Idaho, they were necessarily "unavailable" and 
that, in the absence of proof that the State caused the witnesses to become unavailable, their 
unavailability was automatically a sufficient justification (i.e., "good cause" within the meaning 
of I.C. § 19-3501) for delaying Mr. Ciccone's trial. 4 (Respondent's Brief, pp.20-27.) As an 
alternative to its contention that Mr. Ciccone's argument fails on its merits, the State further 
asserts that any violation of the speedy trial statute is harmless because "the remedy for a 
statutory speedy trial violation is dismissal without prejudice. See I.C. §§ 19-3501, 19-3506." 
4 On appeal, the State has failed to argue its other claimed bases for continuing Mr. Ciccone's 
trial from its original setting of July 20, 2004, to its ultimate setting of January 5, 2005. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.22 n.4 ("The State believes the trial court's determination as to the 
unavailability of witnesses is dispositive of Ciccone's statutory speedy trial claim and therefore 
limits its analysis of the reason for delay to this issue. The State, however, does not waive these 
additional grounds for delay but relies on and incorporates by reference herein the prosecutor's 
argument and the district court's rationale.").) Thus, whether intentional or not, the State has 
forfeited any argument arising out of these grounds for the continuance. See I.A.R. 3 5(b)( 6) 
(requiring that the respondent's brief on appeal contain "the contentions of the respondent ... , 
the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and 
record relied upon"); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited 
on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking .... "). 
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(Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29.) Only then does the State address Mr. Ciccone's constitutional 
claims. (Respondent's Brief, pp.29-35.) While the State's arguments address each of the four 
factors in the Barker v. Wingo test, of note for purposes of this Reply Brief are its claims that the 
purported "unavailability" of its witnesses was a valid reason for delaying Mr. Ciccone's trial 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.31-33), and that Mr. Ciccone failed to timely assert his right to a speedy 
trial (Respondent's Brief, p.33).5 
As set forth below, the State's arguments are without merit. First, it is clear that the 
State's "unavailability" analysis is deeply flawed. Second, as even the State concedes, the Idaho 
courts have already recognized that, with the statutory right to a speedy trial comes a meaningful 
remedy of some kind and, thus, speedy trial rights vindicated on appeal must result in reversals 
of convictions. Finally, contrary to the State's claim, Mr. Ciccone clearly and unequivocally 
asserted his right to a speedy trial. 
A. Whether We Are Talking About The Constitutional Or Statutory Right To A Speedy 
Trial, The State Is Incorrect When It Claims That A Witness's Temporary Military Duty 
Outside The State Is Automatically A Sufficient Reason For Delaying A Defendant's 
Trial 
Repeatedly citing the same three cases-Bell v. State, 651 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007), Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 2005)), and Kelley v. Commonwealth,439 
S.E. 2d 616 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)-the State argues that "the unavailability of a material witness 
due to service in the United States armed forces constitutes sufficient justification for delay" of a 
defendant's trial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.23, 26-27.) Implicit in this argument is the 
5 The State's arguments with regard to the other two Barker factors-the length of the delay and 
the prejudice owing to that delay-are unremarkable and, therefore, are adequately addressed by 
Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.23-24 (length of delay), pp.35-36 
(prejudice). ) 
13 
assumption that merely being assigned to temporary military duty out of state necessarily makes 
one "unavailable" for trial. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.22-24, 26-27.) 
While the State's argument is suppOlied by the three out-of-state cases it relies upon, 
none of these cases is particularly persuasive. In each instance, the court in question simply 
assumed (as the district court did below in this case, and as the State asks this Court to do now), 
that the temporary out-of-state military assignment of a witness creates "an unqualified inability" 
on the part of that witness to attend the defendant's trial, not just a burden on him. 6 See Bell, 287 
Ga. App. at 302; Hyland, 875 A.2d at 1191-92; Kelley, 439 S.E.2d at 619. However, such an 
approach is questionable since, it should not be assumed that the military would have refused the 
State's request to allow the witnesses in question to travel back to Idaho for Mr. Ciccone's trial. 7 
Indeed, the State has offered no reason to believe that a serviceman temporarily stationed out of 
state could not be compelled to return to the State of Idaho through issuance of an appropriate 
subpoena or warrant, or that, in the interest of comity, the United States military would not allow 
6 As was noted in Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief (pp.26-27), as well as the State's 
Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23), in State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828 (Ct. App. 2005), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals held that, when Barker spoke of a "missing witness" being a valid reason for the 
government to delay a criminal defendant's trial, "there is an enormous difference between [a 
witness] being inconvenienced and being unavailable. True unavailability suggests an 
unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that attendance at trial would 
be burdensome." Id. at 837. 
7 In his Appellant's Brief (pp.28, 29), Mr. Ciccone cited People v. Chardon, 2005 WL 2866923 
*4 (N.Y. S. Ct. 2005) (unpublished opinion), for the commonsense notion that it cannot be 
assumed that witnesses whose military service has taken them out of state are per se 
"unavailable" under Barker v. Wingo. As the State correctly points out though, the portion of 
Chardon relied upon by Mr. Ciccone appears to have been rejected by an intermediate appellate 
court in New York. See People v. Chardon, 922 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
Nevertheless, Mr. Ciccone contends that it is illogical to presume that, just because someone is 
out of state on military business, that person is necessarily unable to attend an Idaho trial. Such a 
bright-line rule, although convenient, tends to undermine Barker v. Wingo's fact-specific inquiry, 
as well as the requirement that the government show the witness's unqualified inability to attend 
the trial. 
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its servicemen to return to Idaho. Quite to the contrary, the State's own arguments in favor of a 
continuance suggest that the witnesses' attendance may very well have been secured had it acted 
in a timely fashion. (See, e.g., R. Vol. I, pp.107-08 (,,[T]he State ... has witnesses who are 
unavailable because of temporary assignments out of the state and as such all subpoena's [sic] 
must go through the military chain of command to get them back to Idaho to testify."); Tr. Vol. 
VII, p.13, Ls.3-8 ("If I am going to be able to send [subpoenas] to them, then I have to get not 
only an out of state court to serve them, lawfully serve them, but in a case where they are in 
South Korea, we would have to go through the Federal Court system to even get those served 
over there.").) 
As was argued in Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief, the reality is that the State has failed 
In this case to meet its burden of demonstrating that the witnesses at issue were truly 
"unavailable." (See Appellant's Brief, pp.26-29.) To show true unavailability, the State must 
show that, despite its diligent efforts, it was unable to secure the presence of the relevant 
witnesses. Here, the State has utterly failed to show that it made diligent effolis to obtain the 
attendance of the witnesses in question. 
While the State would have this Court believe that the district court found that it had 
made "diligent efforts to obtain" the information that would have allowed it to secure the 
attendance of the witnesses in question (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26 (emphasis added», that 
claim is untrue. In fact, the citation now relied upon by the State reveals that the district court 
found only that "the prosecution in this case did make efforts to be in touch with the Air Force 
regarding these witnesses .... " (Tr. Vol. VII, p.29, Ls.5-7 (emphasis added).) Moreover, the 
facts could not have supported such a finding since, as was discussed in some detail in 
Mr. Ciccone's Appellant's Brief, the crux of the State's problem in securing the attendance of its 
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witnesses was that it chose not to independently investigate this case and, instead, hoped to have 
its case handed to it on a silver platter by Air Force investigators. (See Appellant's Brief, p.27.) 
Thus, contrary to the State's assertion on appeal (see Respondent's Brief, pp.25-27), it was, in 
fact, negligent in its prosecution of this case and its negligence did contribute to the purported 
"unavailability" of its witnesses. 
B. The District Court's Violation Of Mr. Ciccone's Statutory Right To A Speedy Trial Is 
Not Without A Remedy 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that, even if Mr. Ciccone's statutory right to a 
speedy trial in was violated in this case, that error was harmless because the only remedy for a 
violation of that right is dismissal without prejudice. (Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29.) In 
essence, the State seeks to have this Court hold that there is no real remedy for speedy trial 
violations. 
Not only is the State's argument flawed as a matter of policy, cf Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if 
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."), but it is also inconsistent 
with precedent. Even the State acknowledges that in State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 497 
(Ct. App. 1987), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the remedy for statutory speedy trial 
violations found on appeal is reversal of the convictions in question. (Respondent's Brief, p.28.) 
And Stuart was not an aberration, as a similar result obtained in State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 
619, 626-27 (Ct. App. 2001), where the Court of Appeals found a violation of the defendant's 
statutory right to a speedy trial and, as a result, reversed the judgment of conviction. 
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C. Mr. Ciccone Clearly And Unequivocally Asserted His Right To A Speedv Trial 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that all four of the Barker v. Wingo factors 
weigh in his favor. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-36.) In doing so, he pointed out that he had timely 
asserted his right to a speedy trial below. (Appellant's Brief, pp.34-35.) However, the State now 
claims otherwise, arguing as follows: 
Although Ciccone asserted his statutory right to a speedy trial at the 
July 19,2004 hearing [on the State's motion for a continuance on the eve of trial] 
(7/19/04 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-23), he did not unequivocally assert his constitutional 
right to a speedy trial until he filed his motion to dismiss on December 20, 2004 
(R. vol. II, pp.168-69; see also Trial Tr., p.41, L.18 p.43, L.2.) 
(Respondent's Brief, p.33 (emphasis in original).) 
The State's present argument is meritless. Barker says nothing about the defendant 
having to explicitly cite the Constitution in order to gain the benefit of its guarantee of a speedy 
trial; in discussing the importance of the defendant's assertion of his right, that opinion focused 
on whether the defendant expressed a desire to have his case tried because such a desire is the 
best evidence of whether he was deprived of a fair trial through its delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 
531-32. In this case, Mr. Ciccone clearly and unequivocally expressed such a desire. (Tr. Vol. 
VII, p.19, Ls.17-23, p.22, Ls.21-22.) 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Upon Mr. Ciccone A Sentence (Fixed 
Life) Which Is Excessive Given Any View Of The Facts 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone argued that his fixed life sentence is excessive in 
light of the overwhelming nature of the mitigating evidence before the district court, as well as 
the relatively (for a first degree murder case) non-egregious circumstances of the offense. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.38-51.) In response, the State presents a host of reasons why it believes 
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that Mr. Ciccone's fixed life sentence does not represent an abuse of the district court's 
sentencing discretion (Respondent's Brief, pp.36-44), most of which are unremarkable and, thus, 
require no further response. However, a few discreet issues warrant some clarification. 
First, the State contends that Mr. Ciccone has never accepted responsibility nor expressed 
any remorse for the criminality of his actions. (Respondent's Brief, p.37.) This claim is 
extremely misleading, if not patently false. In fact, as was observed in Mr. Ciccone's 
Appellant's Brief (pp.47-48), while Mr. Ciccone has not adopted the State's theory of the case or 
the jury's belief about what he was thinking when he hit his wife with his vehicle, he has 
nevertheless taken responsibility for her death and the death of his unborn child, and has 
expressed a great deal of remorse. When asked how he felt about his crimes, he wrote, "[ d]eeply 
saddened. I would gladly trade my life to save my wife and child. I am beyond sorry. I never 
denied responsibility for their deaths, but I did not murder them." (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinajter,PSI), p.l2.) At another point, he wrote: "I take full responsibility for the 
death of my wife and our child, but it was not in any way a deliberate action. I am deeply sorry 
for all of the pain I've caused my family and for the loss of two young lives." (PSI, p.l9; see 
also June Ciccone Letter, p.8 ("He tells me continuously how sorry he is this happened and how 
he wishes it would have been him instead of Kathleen who died. "), p.9 ("He truly loves Kathleen 
and mourns her loss every day .... ").) 
Second, the State claims that "there was evidence at the scene that suggested Ciccone had 
engaged in a physical confrontation with" his wife immediately before striking her with his car 
(Respondent's Brief, p.43), that allegation is little more than fanciful speculation on the State's 
part. The reality is that, at trial, one of the police detectives wanted to testify that, in his non-
expert opinion, scuff marks and supposed cloth pattern transfers in the dirt were consistent with a 
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physical altercation having occurred. (See Ir. Vol. VIII, p.874, L.9 - p.875, L.25.) However, 
that highly speCUlative, non-expert opinion was precluded. (Ir. Vol. VIII, p.874, L.9 - p.875, 
L.2S.) Ihus, the trial evidence showed only that there were scuff marks in the dirt. 
Finally, with regard to Mr. Ciccone's mental illness, the State asserts that "[t]here is no 
evidence . .. that he in fact has a mental illness or that his suicide attempt was the result of such 
an illness, as opposed to merely attention-seeking behavior .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.43.) 
However, this line of argument on the State's part is meritless. As is discussed in Mr. Ciccone's 
Appellant's Brief, the record in this case is littered with references to Mr. Ciccone's mental 
illness. (See, e.g., Appellant's brief, pp.43-47 (discussing Mr. Ciccone's depression, his suicide 
attempt, his prolonged stay at Intermountain Hospital, his diagnosis with major depressive 
disorder, the many medications that were prescribed for him).) Moreover, while the record does 
not contain an express statement causally linking Mr. Ciccone's mental illness to his suicide 
attempt, the connection appears quite clear. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ciccone 
respectfully requests that his conviction and/or sentence be vacated and either: (a) the case be 
dismissed with prejudice; (b) the case be remanded for a new trial; or (c) his sentence be reduced 
or the case be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
DAIED this 15th day of June, 2012. 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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